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Abstract 
 
This paper synthesises the research related to managing conflict of interests in professional 
accounting firms. The main purpose is to provide information about the current state of knowledge 
on this topic and to highlight the areas requiring further research. The extant research has been 
reviewed by developing a framework through the integration of Risk Management Framework by 
ISO 31000:2009 and the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. Specifically, 
literature has been classified across the establishment of context, assessment, treatment, control 
and monitoring of conflict of interests. The literature reveals that there is a lack of understanding 
about how the conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting professional. 
Addressing this gap will help to develop behavioural interventions for strengthening the 
professionals’ independence in fact and, thereby, facilitating the management of conflict of 
interests.  
 
The key message this synthesised research provides for professional accounting firms and the 
regulators is that, for effective management of conflict of interests, behavioural interventions 
should be informed by the professionals’ unconscious (automatic) as well as their conscious 
(controlled) cognitive processes. This study is the first one to view the conflict of interests in a 
professional accounting environment through the lens of behavioural risk management. Moreover, 
the framework adopted for reviewing the extant literature provides a comprehensive view of the 
issues surrounding the ineffective management of the conflict of interests.  
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in fact, behavioural interventions, behavioural risk management. 
 
 
 
Maria Ishaque, 2019 Accepted Version Journal of Business Ethics 
 1 
1. Introduction 
This paper is meant to synthesise the research around managing conflict of interests in professional 
accounting firms. This is important to add to our understanding of why despite increased 
regulations, the problem of accounting professionals’ deviant behaviour due to conflict of interests 
is still largely pervasive. Almost every year, the professional accounting firms face heavy fines on 
account of the deteriorated audit quality due to conflict of interests (Agnew 2015; Crump 2015; 
Withers 2018). Extant research reveals that this problem is largely pervasive due to ineffective 
management of conflict of interests (Bazerman and Gino 2012; Clements et al. 2012). Although 
the devastating effects of conflict of interests in professional accounting environment are well-
documented (see, for example, Boyd 2004; Daugherty et al. 2012; Favere-Marchesi and Emby 
2005; Pierce and Sweeney 2004), research pertaining to managing conflict of interests is scattered 
across various topics. To be able to identify the current state of knowledge, there is a need to 
synthesise research – this stance has also been supported by recent research (see Endenich and 
Trapp 2018).  
Specifically, literature relevant to managing conflict of interests is found in conjunction with 
research that pertains to the independence of professionals and the accounting firms’ quality 
control procedures. There is convincing evidence in the literature that conflict of interests should 
be treated as a risk (see, for example, IESBA 2018; Johnson and Hansen 2011; Thagard 2007). 
Florio (2012) and Lo and Field (2009) considered the conflict of interests a risk and highlighted 
the need for identifying, assessing, controlling and monitoring the conflict of interests. Similarly, 
Bedard et al. (2008) also support the identification, assessment and control of conflict of interests. 
In this regard, various researchers (see, for example, Guiral et al 2010; Moore et al 2010) strongly 
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support the adoption of behavioural perspective. Therefore, this study looks at the conflict of 
interests through the lens of behavioural risk management and defines conflict of interests as; 
‘a situation involving a disagreement between the accounting profession’s primary interest and 
the professional’s secondary interest(s) which, in turn, leads to the likelihood of deviant 
behaviour’. 
Owing to the novelty of behavioural risk management perspective, there is a need to consolidate 
extant literature relevant to the measures applied for managing conflict of interests in professional 
accounting firms. With a specific focus on accounting professionals’ behaviour in the events of 
conflicting interests, the second section on research synthesis will present the framework for 
reviewing, interpreting and analysing literature and will include literature that can potentially 
inform the establishment of context, assessment, treatment, control and monitoring of conflict of 
interests. Analysis of literature will be elaborated in the third section, followed by identification of 
the ‘gaps in literature’ in the fourth section. Finally, this paper will be concluded in the fifth section. 
2. Research Synthesis 
2.1. Framework for Reviewing, Interpreting and Analysing Literature 
The framework for synthesising extant literature draws on the integration of the Risk Management 
Framework by ISO 31000:2009 and the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
by International Ethics and Standards Board of Accountants – IESBA.  
According to ISO 31000:2009, risk management process includes four main stages, i.e. 
establishing the context for risk management, assessment of risks, treatment of risks, and control 
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and monitoring. Since this paper is looking at the conflict of interests through the lens of risk 
management, the risk management framework is of relevance (ISO 2009). Moreover, the Code of 
Ethics provides that compliant professional behaviour is about compliance with five fundamental 
principles of professional ethics, i.e. integrity, objectivity, professional competence & due care, 
confidentiality and professional behaviour. The code also recognises various threats, i.e. self-
interest (i.e. due to financial or other personal interest), self-review (i.e. when professionals have 
to review their own work), advocacy (i.e. when professionals promote client position), familiarity 
(i.e. due to long-term or close firm-client relations) and intimidation threat (i.e. due to actual or 
perceived pressures) to compliance with fundamental principles, in general, and to the 
professional’s independence, in particular. To counter the likely devastating impact of these 
threats, some safeguards are created by profession and legislation, and some exist in the work 
environment of accounting firms (IESBA 2015, 2018).  
A closer insight into the code of ethics for professional accountants and the risk management 
framework reveals convincing similarities and connection between the two. For instance, the code 
also follows a risk-based approach and involves identification and evaluation of threats to 
compliance with fundamental principles of professional ethics. If the threats are at an acceptable 
level, there is no need to apply safeguards. However, if the threats are at an unacceptable level, 
safeguards have to be applied to ensure that these are eliminated or are brought to an acceptable 
level. The said approach is exactly in accordance with the entire risk management process. 
Importantly, the code of ethics suggests that compliance with fundamental principles of 
professional ethics constitutes compliant behaviour, i.e. the primary interest of the accounting 
profession. Similarly, the threats to compliance with fundamental principles serve as the sources 
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of secondary interest that interfere with primary interest and give rise to a conflict of interests – a 
risk that compliant behaviour will be compromised (IESBA 2018; Johnson and Hansen 2011). 
Figure 1 presents the framework that serves as a thematic guide to be adopted for reviewing, 
interpreting and analysing the literature that informs management of conflict of interests in 
professional accounting firms. 
Insert Figure 1: Framework for Literature Review, Interpretation and Analysis here 
As per the framework, the risk management process for a conflict of interests begins with the 
establishment of context for the entire process. Next, the identification, analysis and evaluation 
(i.e. assessment) of conflict of interests follows – these steps address the threats to compliance 
with primary interest. Finally, the treatment and control and monitoring of the procedures meant 
to deal with conflict of interests follow – these steps involve the application of safeguards to ensure 
that conflict of interest has been managed in accordance with the context. The framework also 
highlights that control and monitoring measures are reviewed and improved continually and the 
context adjusted accordingly. It must, however, be noted that the same literature study might 
inform more than one stages in the framework. Moreover, the classification should be considered 
as being subjective and based on the researcher’s discretion. 
2.2. Establishing the Context for Managing Conflict of Interests 
The literature in this section will highlight the main parameters that are of direct relevance to 
professional accounting firms for establishing an appropriate context for managing conflict of 
interests. In this regard, studies and provisions related to various internal and external regulations 
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that have emerged over the past decade, especially in response to numerous corporate scandals, 
will be included.  
2.2.1. Quality Control Reviews and Inspections 
Regulators have declared the ex-post engagement reviews mandatory and they see such reviews 
and inspections (such as within-team reviews, engagement quality review, and peer review) as 
potential deterrents to the lapses in audit quality (Bedard et al 2008). The purpose of such reviews 
is to ensure that the firms’ personnel comply with the profession’s standards and that of the firm’s 
own standards of quality. In this regard, Hatfield et al (2011) asserted that one of the potential 
benefits of engagement quality reviews is that these tend to reduce the instances of a tendency to 
focus more on confirmatory than on disconfirming evidence. However, engagement quality control 
review must be completed before the audit report is issued. Regarding the peer reviews, Deis and 
Rose (2011) provided that accounting firms undertaking these reviews tend to conduct higher 
quality audits and this trend of improvement continues over time with continued participation in 
peer reviews.  
Nonetheless, the extent to which peer reviews detect problems in reviewed engagements is yet to 
be researched more. Furthermore, regulatory quality control reviews and inspections are conducted 
by government regulators with a focus on examining if the firm complies with professional 
standards. The quality reviews are, primarily, conducted after the audit and other accounting 
engagements – however, the accounting firms tend to consider these regulatory requirements 
before commencing the process of managing risks. This is because the establishment of context 
for risk management demands to take into consideration the applicable rules and regulations. 
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Accordingly, the awareness and information of applicable quality control reviews and inspections 
are fed into the process of managing conflict of interests. 
2.2.2. Codes of Conduct 
Contextual factors such as professional or organisational norms have widely been agreed to affect 
ethical decision-making. Some researchers (Adams et al 2001; Bazerman and Gino 2012; Weaver 
and Treviño 2001) assert that the normative tone is reflected through the codes of conduct and the 
moral guidelines issued by management in organisations. Similarly, based on the ethical codes of 
conduct, employees form their perceptions of ethical climate and of how peers would do in a 
similar situation (Fatemi et al 2018; Jones et al 2003; Shafer et al 2001). This implies that well-
drafted ethical codes of conduct have the power to influence ethical behaviour and the way 
professionals would handle conflict of interests. Clements et al (2012) critically examined the 
conflict of interests in the accounting profession and strongly asserted that firms should improve 
their codes of conduct for their provisions regarding prioritisation of interests.  
Similarly, Douglas et al (2001) emphasised the significance of organisational values as reflected 
in the codes of conduct. They held that organisational values are of immense importance in 
professional accounting firms and that these values are taken as a means of control. However, it is 
not enough to just chalk out the codes of conduct because their purpose is fulfilled with employees 
following it. In this regard, the symbolic nature of ethical codes of conduct has been examined in 
some previous studies (see, for example, Citron 2003; Preston et al 1995).  Therefore, extant 
literature suggests that the correct establishment of context for managing conflict of interests 
requires professional accounting firms to be aware of the internal codes of conduct. Such codes 
are relevant throughout the process of managing conflict of interests and especially when 
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establishing the context. This is because the culture and standards prevalent in professional 
accounting firms play an indispensable role in defining the scope of the program to manage conflict 
of interests, the policy for managing conflict of interests and the risk criteria. 
2.2.3. Ethics and Compliance Programs 
Florio (2012) has regarded the conflict of interests as the virus. The author asserted that the best 
antidote for the harms caused by the conflict of interests is the strong ethics programmes, as well 
as a strong internalised sense of ethics by everyone in an organisation. He maintained that a good 
ethics and compliance programme is essential for the conflicting interests identified and prioritised 
by the firms. Other suggestions for developing an effective ethics and compliance programme 
included: establishment of standards and procedures, making specialised committees to oversee 
governance structure, education and training to manage conflict, developing an appropriate risk 
management framework, careful design of incentives that align with the ethics and compliance 
programme and necessary amendments in ethics and compliance programmes. 
Similarly, for effective management of conflict of interests, Williford and Small (2013) also 
favoured the establishment of a strong ethics and compliance program. Particularly, they 
recommended that the steps issued by Federal Sentencing Guidelines for guidance on prevention 
of conflict of interests should be incorporated in the design and implementation of compliance and 
ethics program. These steps include standards and procedures (codes of ethical conduct and 
conflict of interests’ policy), organisational leadership and a culture of compliance (tone at the 
top), efforts to exclude prohibited persons (due diligence), training and communication (education 
and awareness), monitoring, auditing and evaluating program effectiveness (program evaluation), 
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performance incentives and discipline (recognition and enforcement) and remedial action 
(prevention and risk assessment).  
With specific reference to the association between leadership and conflict of interests, Florio 
(2012) maintained that, to address the conflict of interests, there is an immense need to establish 
effective processes that should be executed under strong leadership. Furthermore, the top managers 
can take some steps to reduce ethical dilemmas amongst their subordinates such as by being the 
role models and enforcing an ethical code of conduct. Therefore, having strong ethics and 
compliance programs is directly relevant to the entire process of managing the conflict of interests. 
At the stage of establishing the context for managing conflict of interests, professional accounting 
firms need to take into consideration the ethics and compliance programs and implement these as 
an eminent part of the entire risk management process. 
2.2.4. Organisational Culture 
According to Florio (2012), managing the conflict of interests requires far more than just a strong 
compliance programme, and that the organisational culture should reinforce ethical conduct and 
not tolerate anything that casts doubts on high ethical standards. Some researchers (Jones et al. 
2003; Shafer et al. 2001) found that ethical climate largely affects accountants in their ethical 
reasoning process. In a laboratory study, Booth and Schulz (2004) found that the individual’s 
behaviour moves in the same direction as that of the ethical climate of an organisation. Similarly, 
Douglas et al. (2001) suggested that the ethical tendencies of accountants are also affected by the 
organisational culture. The impact of managerial philosophy on behaviour has also been 
researched widely. When the philosophies of managers and supervisors emphasise social and 
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ethical responsibilities, employees are more likely to behave ethically. Similarly, when the 
philosophies emphasise profits, employees are more likely to engage in unethical behaviour.  
Furthermore, the relationship between the contingencies of reinforcement and ethical decision-
making behaviour has also been supported by various researchers (e.g. Stead et al. 1987; Worrell 
et al. 1985). While emphasising the importance of tone at the top, Caldarelli et al. (2012) strongly 
asserted that the role of ethics originates in a commitment of the top management for an ethical 
culture. Similarly, Treviño et al. (2003) asserted that because executive leaders of a firm have the 
potential to influence the employees and organisational behaviour, they play an extremely 
important role in shaping the ethical environment. Overall, extant literature demonstrates that 
executives of an organisation shape the ethical environment by setting an ethical tone at the top 
(see Bobek and Radtke, 2007).  
Therefore, extant literature asserts establishment of strong ethical culture as a precursor to defining 
the scope of the program to manage conflict of interests, forming the policy for managing conflict 
of interests and outlining the risk criteria. The relevant literature also provides that the importance 
of firms’ culture begins with the establishment of context and continues throughout the entire 
process for managing conflict of interests that accounting professionals face.   
2.3. Assessment of Conflict of Interests 
The extant literature provides that when carrying out identification, analysis and evaluation 
towards the management of conflict of interests, the issues surrounding independence of an 
accounting professional are part and parcel of the entire process. With reference to the framework 
for reviewing, interpreting and analysing literature (figure 1), it is pertinent to consider how the 
various threats might impair the independence of an accounting professional. The literature 
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relevant to the assessment of conflict of interests is primarily focused on the independence of an 
accounting professional. This is because the conflict of interests and the independence are 
discussed in conjunction with one another (Bazerman and Gino 2012; Dopuch et al. 2003; Guiral 
et al. 2010; Moore et al. 2006; Nelson 2004).  
This section will include literature that relates to the identification of the internal and external 
sources, causes and the potential consequences of conflict of interests (i.e. identification). Studies 
informing the process used to understand the nature, sources, and causes of the identified sources 
and to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of conflicting interests (i.e. analysis) will also be 
reviewed. Furthermore, literature informing the professionals’ evaluation if the conflicts of 
interests are acceptable or need treatment (i.e. evaluation) will also be discussed. 
2.3.1. Commercial Origin of Conflict of Interests 
This part includes the review of studies that discuss the origin of conflict of interests due to the 
shift in accounting firms from professionalism to commercialism. In his study about ethics and 
accounting firms, Pierce (2007) discussed that the increasing commercial pressures, such as due 
to the corporate merger movement of the 1960s, gave rise to dysfunctional consequences for 
accounting firms. Such dysfunctional consequences included prioritisation of client satisfaction 
over professional standards (Sánchez-Medina et al. 2019) and of maximisation of profit/fee over 
audit quality. Some researchers (Boyd 2004; McMillan 2004; Pierce 2007; Reinstein and 
McMillan 2004; Young 2005) agree on a stance that the corporate merger movement of the 1960s 
put stress on the ability of accounting firms to retain professional integrity. Merging corporations 
retained one of the two previous auditors and resorted to opinion shopping (i.e. the practice of 
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searching for an external auditor who would provide an unqualified opinion). The accounting 
firms, resultantly, became commercialised and were perceived to be serving the clients’ interest.  
The merger activity within the accounting profession itself in the 1970s and 1980s (such as, the 
merger of big eight to form the then big five) also distorted their professionalism. The objective of 
such a merger, according to Boyd (2004), was to achieve bigger revenues, the concentration of 
power, and the ability to push the competition out from consultancy and management advisory 
enterprises. Thus, the firms began organising them in business-like structures, with client 
satisfaction as their priority (Boyd 2004; Stumpf et al. 2002). Further to the aforementioned 
devastating impacts of commercialism in accounting firms, several research studies (see, for 
example, Boyd 2004; Pierce and Sweeney 2004) asserted that commercial pressures also 
deteriorated audit quality. These studies indicate that the shift from professionalism to 
commercialism made accounting firms deviate from their professional duties, which also implies 
a deviation from compliant behaviour or from serving in the best interest of the public.  
Many researchers (Beattie and Fearnley 2002; Boyd 2004; Espinosa-Pike and Barrainkua 2016; 
McMillan 2004; Pierce 2007; Reinstein and McMillan 2004; Stumpf et al. 2002; Young 2005) 
posited that commercial pressures led accounting firms to provide non-audit services which in turn 
created the conflict of interests for the professionals. Therefore, commercialism is considered one 
of the root causes of deviation from professionalism and it comes with many dysfunctional 
consequences. Similarly, research in this area has implications for professional accounting firms 
to increase their efforts towards managing conflict of interests across any threats to their 
professionalism. The commercial origin of conflict of interests in professional accounting firms is, 
therefore, of direct relevance to the identification, analysis and evaluation of conflict of interests. 
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2.3.2. Structural Origin of Conflict of Interests 
Various researchers have used archival, analytical and behavioural methodologies to examine the 
issues surrounding independence risk. The main issues include long term relation with clients, 
employing former auditors, provision of non-audit services, and compensation of partners. 
Although these concerns are managed before accounting firms take up the engagement, they do 
have an effect on a professional’s conduct during the engagement. The following sub-sections will 
include literature regarding the origin of conflicting interests in professional accounting firms due 
to the various structural features.  
2.3.2.1. Client-Firm Relation 
Independence concerns, primarily, arise from a close relationship with client management and the 
keenness of accounting firms to please clients for maintaining the stream of fees (Arel et al. 2006). 
Both the archival and behavioural studies have focused on the tenure of an accounting professional. 
Overall, archival studies remain inconclusive of the association of tenure of the audit firm and that 
of audit quality. For instance, Deis and Giroux (1992) found that the tenure of audit-client 
relationship is positively associated with conflict of interests and the subsequent reduction in audit 
quality and provided that the longer audit tenure leads to poor audit quality. On the contrary, Geiger 
and Raghunandan (2002) examined the association between the type of issued audit opinion and 
the length of audit tenure. They found more audit reporting failures in the early years of firm-client 
relationship and suggested that partners’ rotation might not be beneficial. Similarly, Johnson et al. 
(2002) also supported the stance that longer the auditor tenure, the better the financial reporting.  
Behavioural research, however, seems to support the rotation of accounting firm partners. For 
instance, Dopuch et al. (2001) used experimental methods to examine the extent to which auditor 
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independence is affected in different regimes of rotation and retention of accounting firms. They 
found that the auditors tend to be more biased in favour of clients during the regimes that do not 
require rotation. Similarly, Favere-Marchesi and Emby (2005) reported that compared to new 
concurring partners, the continuing concurring partners are less likely to conclude that purchased 
goodwill might be impaired. Moreover, Hatfield et al. (2011) examine the impact of prior audit 
involvement and client pressure on proposed audit adjustments and concluded that partners’ 
rotation has positive effects on audit quality.  Overall, the behavioural studies associate long tenure 
of audit-client relationship to poor audit quality.  
Although the direction of the association between long term client-firm relationship and audit 
quality remains inconclusive, both the archival and behavioural research indicates that the long-
term relationship of clients and professional accounting firms might threaten audit quality due to 
the conflict of interests. Literature indicates that in situations like the long-term relationship 
between the client and the firm, various threats are likely to arise including self-interest and 
familiarity threats. 
2.3.2.2. Employing Former Accounting professionals 
Prior to the collapse of Enron in 2001, it was a common practice amongst clients to hire the former 
accounting professionals from the firms auditing their statements. The common reason for clients 
to do so was, arguably, to benefit from the hired professional’s knowledge of clients’ business, 
their understanding of financial reporting process and other information systems (Beasley et al. 
2000). This practice, however, was discouraged with the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in 2002 that required clients to not hire from their former auditors for up to a period of one-
year, post-audit, termed the cooling-off period (Ahmad 2015). The employment of the members 
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from the engagement team is of concern to managing conflict of interests due to the possibility of 
impaired independence in such situations. Koh and Mahathevan (1993) found that the perceptions 
of loss of independence were higher for shorter cooling-off periods and argued that employment 
opportunities with clients might induce the accounting professionals to serve client’s interests due 
to their impaired independence.  
Other researchers (see, for example, Beasley et al. 2000; Menon and Williams 2004) used archival 
methods to examine the possibility of impaired independence in cases where clients employ former 
accounting professionals. These studies agree that such employment of former professionals is 
likely to result in loss of independence as well as the loss of professional scepticism and that the 
employment opportunities with clients might induce the accounting professionals to serve client’s 
interests. However, Geiger et al. (2005) did not find any evidence that the hiring of former 
accounting professionals is associated with aggressive financial reporting on account of impaired 
independence. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) associates the hiring of former 
auditors as giving rise to the self-interest and familiarity threats. The threats further give rise to a 
deviation from serving the primary interest of the accounting profession (Ahmad 2015) and imply 
the presence of a conflict of interests.  
Overall, the literature indicates that in situations like the hiring of former accounting professionals, 
various threats are likely to arise including self-interest, familiarity and intimidation threats. 
2.3.2.3. Provision of Non-Audit Services 
One of the widely researched topics relevant to conflict of interests in professional accounting 
firms is to examine whether the provision of non-audit services results in impaired independence 
and audit quality. Under certain circumstances, professional accounting firms are permitted to 
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provide non-audit services. However, based on a principle that provision of non-audit services 
harms the actual or perceived quality of an audit, the current rules under SOX prohibit the 
accounting firms from providing some non-audit services (Bedard et al. 2008). Some researchers 
(Boyd 2004; Citron 2003; Frankel et al. 2002) have reported the provision of non-audit services 
as a threat to accounting professionals’ independence. Numerous other studies have also associated 
the provision of non-audit services directly with conflict of interests. In this regard, several 
researchers (Boyd 2004; McMillan 2004; Pierce 2007; Reinstein and McMillan 2004; Young 
2005) support the stance that commercial pressures led accounting firms to provide non-audit 
services which in turn created the conflicts of interests for accounting professionals.  
The stance that higher fees for non-audit services induce firms to provide non-audit services and 
thereby creates a conflict of interests is supported by various researchers (Frankel et al. 2002; 
Ruddock et al. 2004). Although, some researchers (Craswell et al. 2002; Defond and Francis 2005; 
Skaife et al. 2003) do not support the view that higher non-audit fee affects the issued audit 
opinions. However, most of the studies report a direct association between the two variables. Still 
others (Kinney et al. 2004; Sharma and Sidhu 2001) supported this association in certain 
circumstances.  
Furthermore, with reference to the harms of threatened independence and the provision of non-
audit services, Bazerman and Gino (2012) suggested that by providing non-audit services to the 
clients, the auditors open themselves to the criticisms of subjectivity, compromising their 
independence and the prioritisation of public interests. They provided that provision of non-audit 
services to the clients leads to biased decision-making. Overall, the research relevant to the 
provision of non-audit services suggests that such arrangements give rise to the conflict of interests 
in professional accounting firms. Importantly, Beattie and Fearnley (2002) provided that the 
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provision of non-audit services gives rise to the self-interest, self-review, advocacy and familiarity 
threats. 
2.3.2.4. Hiring and Firing of Professional Accounting Firms 
The hiring and firing of auditors by the clients are believed to create a conflict of interests that 
tends to impair the auditors’ independence (Bae et al. 2013; Mayhew and Pike 2004; O’Connor 
2006; Ronen 2010). Similarly, because the decision to hire and fire the accounting firms rests with 
clients, the members of the engagement team are perceived as not being independent in their 
conduct. According to Moore et al. (2006), the accounting firms have incentives to avoid the 
provision of negative audit opinion about clients who hire them. Therefore, in such a situation, 
accounting professionals are perceived to be dependent on their clients. 
With particular reference to the practice of opinion shopping and the role of audit committees, 
Lennox (2003) provided that hiring and firing of auditors is the responsibility of client’s audit 
committee which supposedly works independently of the client’s management. In practice, 
however, the management exerts considerable influence on hiring and firing of the external 
auditors such that the audit committee’s authority is compromised. Thus, the committee’s decision 
to hire and fire is largely affected by management’s preferences in this regard. Literature indicates 
that since clients have the power to hire and fire accounting firms, they are likely to have 
considerable influence on how the services are provided by professional accounting firms. 
Therefore, in situations like this, various threats to compliance with fundamental principles of 
professional ethics are likely to arise including self-interest, advocacy and intimidation threats. 
2.3.3. Workplace Pressures 
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Workplace pressures have been associated with various dysfunctional practices that include a wide 
range of behaviours which not only threaten the quality of audit but also encourage the provision 
of non-audit services in the best interest of clients (Espinosa-Pike and Barrainkua 2016). In both 
instances, the primary interest of the accounting profession is believed to be compromised (Pierce 
2007). One strand of research highlights various dysfunctional behaviours committed by 
professionals such as not testing fully the required number of samples and the falsification of 
working papers (Sikka 2004), premature signing-off on audit assignments (Otley and Pierce 1996), 
inadequate paperwork and under-reporting of audit hours by the auditors in order to avoid budget 
overruns (Anderson-Gough et al. 2001).  
Another strand of research tends to examine the causes of such dysfunctional behaviours. For 
instance, several researchers (see, for example, Boyd 2004; Pierce 2007; Pierce and Sweeney 
2004) attributed commercial pressures faced by accounting firms to a reduction in audit quality. 
Some agree that dysfunctional behaviours are an outcome of various other workplace pressures 
that the professional face, such as time pressure due to the tight deadlines and time budgets given 
to accounting professionals (Anderson-Gough et al. 2001; Sikka 2004) and the obedience pressure 
(Davis et al. 2006). For instance, because articling students and juniors want to excel in a career, 
they face pressure to deliver within a highly limited time (i.e. time pressure) and pressure to obey 
seniors (i.e. obedience pressure).  
According to Boyd (2004), workplace pressures in accounting firms have their roots in the practice 
of opinion shopping. The authors discussed that as the organisations began resorting to price-shop 
(opinion-shop) for audit services, accounting firms realised that the controllable variable at their 
disposal was the price. They had to offer audit services at a cheap price and in order to cut the cost 
of auditing, the firms had two main option i.e., either by reducing labour-hours devoted to audit or 
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by reducing cost per labour hour. Accordingly, the accounting firms reduced their costs by 
dedicating highly limited hours to audit and non-audit services and by hiring the low-cost auditors 
(such as articling students or junior auditors) – in both the cases, audit-quality deteriorated. 
Therefore, various pressures made the accounting professionals deviate from the primary interest 
of serving in the best interest of the public.  
Thus, literature draws attention towards the fact that many pressures originate from within the 
work environment in professional accounting firms and resultantly, many threats arise that serve 
as secondary interest for an accounting professional. For instance, given the tight deadlines, a 
junior professional might compromise the quality of work in order to secure the chances of 
progression in a career (self-interest threat) and a professional might feel pressurised to act in 
accordance with their senior’s priority to serve the clients’ interests (i.e. intimidation threat). 
Therefore, various workplace pressures threaten professionals’ conduct and act as the sources of 
secondary interests and, hence, have relevance to the assessment of conflict of interests.     
2.3.4. Reward Systems 
Reward systems are meant to motivate performance in a particular way. In this regard, the main 
motivators used by organisations to encourage certain behaviour include goal setting, 
acknowledgement of employees’ achievements, a delegation of authority, and monetary rewards 
(Amali 2010). Such reward systems, however, have been associated with conflict of interests in 
professional accounting firms. For instance, Pierce (2007) reported that a number of conflict of 
interests in accounting firms originated within their marketing and sales activities that were 
encouraged by internal reward systems and cultural norms of the firms. Likewise, Goto (2004) 
also investigated the association of rewards structures with ethical behaviour and found that the 
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right reward structures were positively related to ethical behaviour. Furthermore, Green and 
Zimiles (2013) provided that most of the conflict of interests with reference to reward systems 
involve financial motives but may also involve advancement and recognition.  
Arguably, even if the accounting firm has a good reputation and high standards, individuals within 
the firm may be inclined to give in to the pressure from clients and engage in behaviour that is not 
in accordance with the ethical standards. The motivational and control structures in an organisation 
are of immense importance in aligning the goals of individual accounting professional with that of 
the firms (Fearnley et al. 2002). Amali (2010) found that the immediate causes of unethical 
behaviours include incorrect implementation of motivators, simultaneous use of motivators, and 
the absence of appropriate controls within the workplace. Thus, misaligned rewards can be 
regarded as one of the sources of conflicting interests in an accounting profession.  
Similarly, Wyatt (2004) asserted that the internal culture of greed within the firms gives rise to 
employees’ behavioural changes and that no legislation can solve the problem unless firms 
themselves make efforts. Strong leadership is required to bring about a reversal of such behavioural 
changes. Likewise, Schminke et al. (2007) argued that it is necessary to encourage an environment 
where ethical behaviour is rewarded. Emphasising the power of leaders in this regard, they asserted 
that the organisational leaders should act with moral sensitivity and must have an ability to 
sympathise with employees facing ethical dilemmas. 
The aforementioned literature studies suggest that the rewards misaligned with the primary interest 
of the accounting profession threaten compliant behaviour and can be regarded as one of the broad 
sources of conflict of interests. The main threats that professionals face in such situations include 
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self-interest, self-review and advocacy threats. All such situations involving misaligned rewards 
have important implications towards identification, analysis and evaluation of conflict of interests.   
2.3.5. Bias due to Conflict of Interests  
Literature regarding bias due to conflict of interests tends to focus on the psychological and 
cognitive barriers experienced by individual decision-makers. Studies in this domain revolve 
around the idea of limitations on the conscious mind and the power of the unconscious mind, both 
of which are central to making ethical decisions involving the conflict of interests. The central idea 
is that, when making the decisions, individuals overestimate the influence of their own intentions 
and underestimate the power of automatic processes outside of our consciousness (Casebeer and 
Churchland 2003; Damasio 2006; Moll et al. 2005). For instance, Wagar and Thagard (2004) 
addressed the moral psychology of conflict of interests and developed a decision-making model, 
i.e. ‘GAGE Model’ that draws on cognitive-affective integration during ethical decision-making. 
This model posits that ethical decision-making and reasoning is neither purely cognitive nor purely 
affective but is a combination of both.  These studies have important implications to explain why, 
in the face of a conflict of interests, the deviations from ethical behaviour might occur undesirably. 
Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu and Bazerman (2006) used Moral Seduction Theory to explain why 
accounting professionals are unaware of how morally compromised they have become due to the 
conflict of interests. According to them, potential threats to the independence of auditors are posed 
by three structural features i.e. hiring and firing of auditors by clients, auditors taking jobs with 
clients, and simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services. The authors asserted that in 
the presence of these structural arrangements, auditors become morally seduced to serving self-
interests due to some cognitive barriers such as unconscious bias due to conflict of interests, 
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selective perception, barriers posed by workplace pressures and the barriers imposed by partners 
who prefer maximising the billable hours.  
Similarly, the ethical decision-making research that draws on cognitive models (Guiral et al. 2010; 
Rodgers 2006, 2009; Rodgers and Gago 2001, 2006) asserts the importance of cognitive approach 
for understanding the process through which conflict of interests affect decision-making behaviour 
in professional accounting firms. Accordingly, a decision in a given situation is an outcome of 
interaction information, perception, judgement and decision choice. During the course of this 
interaction, the individual’s perceptions interfere with information and/or judgement to produce 
biased decisions.  With reference to the management of conflicting interests in professional 
accounting firms, Guiral et al. (2010) developed a cognitive approach by connecting Throughput 
Model to Moral Seduction Theory. They examined the role of perceptions in professionals’ 
decision-making and found that conflict of interests resulted in unconscious bias due to the 
significant role of perceptions. Similarly, Ishaque (2019) integrated Throughput Model with Social 
Cognitive Theory and provided empirical evidence that decision-making behaviour, in situations 
involving a conflict of interests, is largely driven by the unconscious perceptual bias.  
Likewise, Chugh et al. (2005) drew attention towards the impact of psychological barriers on 
ethical decisions involving a conflict of interests. The authors asserted that ethical decisions are 
biased by psychological barriers on one’s mind that are characterised by a stubborn view of oneself 
that one is ethical, deserving, and competent and thus not susceptible to conflict of interests. Such 
barriers, according to the authors, increase the risk that otherwise visible conflict of interests will 
not be recognised by that person. Closely related are the studies examining decision-making in the 
face of ethical dilemmas (see, for example, Casebeer and Churchland 2003; Greene et al. 2001; 
Green et al. 2010). The recurring theme of these studies is that the decision outcome in any given 
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situation is affected by the decision-makers’ subjective experience of a given dilemma or similarly, 
the conflict of interests’ situations.  
Furthermore, highlighting the significance of employees’ perceptions regarding the ethical codes 
of conduct, some researchers (see, for example, Jones et al. 2003; Shafer et al. 2001) assert that 
employees form their perceptions of ethical climate and of how peers would do in a similar 
situation. Likewise, the role of ethical predispositions and cognitive moral development as sources 
of bias in decision-making has also received the attention of researchers. For instance, Ashkanasy 
et al. (2006) found that the managers with low cognitive moral development who perceived that 
their organisations overlooked unethical behaviour made less ethical decisions. Importantly, 
literature regarding bias due to conflict of interests provides that situations involving a conflict of 
interests give rise to, largely, the unconscious bias in the decision-making process. However, due 
to the direct impact of perceptions on decision-making, the presence of conflicting interests might 
lead an auditor to engage in intentional corruption as well (Chugh et al. 2005; Guiral et al. 2010; 
Rodgers 2006, 2009; Rodgers and Gago 2001, 2006).  
With particular reference to identification, analysis and evaluation of conflict of interests, the 
extant literature draws attention towards the need for taking into consideration the role of 
professionals’ unconscious perceptual biases, psychological and the cognitive barriers towards 
compliant decision-making. Since these provisions have to do with the professionals’ state of 
mind, these are directly relevant to their independence in fact. As evidenced through the 
aforementioned studies and other relevant neuroscience literature (see, for example, Cotterill 2000; 
Damasio 1994, 2003; Haidt 2001; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Panksepp, 2009), the real challenge 
lies in the fact that ethical decision-making is intuitive and dominated by the unconscious 
emotional processes. Importantly, Panksepp (2009) drew attention to seeking a solution in the 
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unconscious. These studies imply that the accounting profession will be able to manage conflict 
of interests only if the professionals’ unconscious mental processes, in addition to the more known 
conscious cognitive obstacles, are duly considered.    
2.4. Treatment, Control and Monitoring of Conflicting Interests 
This section will include literature that informs treatment, control and monitoring of conflict of 
interests in professional accounting firms. In this regard, literature will particularly be examined 
for the safeguards created by the accounting profession, legislation and regulation and the 
safeguards in the work environment of the professional accounting firms  
2.4.1. Codes of Ethics 
The codes of ethics are implemented as one of the preliminary safeguards for treating, controlling 
and monitoring the conflict of interests. Various accountancy bodies (including AICPA, NASBA, 
AAT, ACCA, ICAEW, CIMA, CIPFA, ICAS and CAI)1 have built their codes of ethics on the 
principles of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 2015 and the International Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants 2018. These codes, therefore, adopt the ‘threats & safeguards 
approach’ for strengthening compliance with the fundamental principles of professional ethical 
conduct, i.e. integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and the 
professional behaviour. Importantly, the codes of ethics provide extensive provisions for 
minimising risks to the professionals’ independence (IESBA 2015, 2018; Johnson and Hansen 
2011).  
Some studies in the professional accounting context have attempted to establish the relevance of 
the codes of ethics to address the conflict of interests and independence issues. Highlighting the 
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impact of ethical codes of conduct on professionalism, Fatemi et al. (2018) support the idea that 
codes of ethics have a positive impact on the professionals’ judgement. An earlier study by Cowton 
(2009) examined if the codes of ethics, implemented by the professional accounting bodies, are 
effective in encouraging ethical behaviour. The findings suggested that although the codes of 
ethics contribute towards creating a decent moral community, these cannot be perfect and should 
be combined with other measures for managing the conflict of interests. Other studies (see, for 
example, Duska et al. 2011; Flanaga and Clarke 2007) also support this stance.  
Thus, the extant literature on the codes of ethics as a safeguard for managing conflict of interests 
provides that the codes are an effective tool for treating, controlling and monitoring the conflict of 
interests. However, there is a need for other complementary measures because the codes alone 
cannot fix all the problems surrounding the accounting professionals’ independence. 
2.4.2. Electronic Decision Aids 
Accounting firms use electronic decision support systems in order to exercise centralised control 
and monitoring over risk management practices in relation to engagement performance and 
independence concerns. The primary reason to employ such decision aids was to improve the 
quality of decisions, especially those related to ex-post engagement review and inspection (Bedard 
et al. 2008). Supporting the use of electronic decision aids, Pierce and Sweeney (2004) provided 
that compared to paper files, the electronic files improved monitoring of the actions of accounting 
professionals. Dowling (2009) discussed the benefits of and barriers to the implementation of 
electronic decision aids and work systems in global accounting firms. Accordingly, the main 
benefits of these systems were reported to be the improvement in risk management, better control 
on staff, better compliance with firm’s audit methodology, consistency in audit approach, 
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enhancement in audit quality due to increased compliance with professional accounting standards, 
increase in efficiency of audits, and improved documentation.  
Following the examination of the impact of information technology (IT) on the productivity of 
accounting firms, Banker et al. (2002) reported increased efficiency due to the implementation of 
IT. Electronic decision aids, however, have also been discussed for their limitations in practical 
usefulness. For instance, the main barriers and costs associated with their implementation include 
over-reliance on systems recommendations, emphasis on ticking-the-box, training to use electronic 
systems, less cost efficiency for smaller engagements, and restricted use due to perceived 
difficulty. Such barriers might cause a professional to misuse the system such as, selection of input 
parameters that will favour the desired outcome (Dowling 2009). Some researchers (Bedard et al. 
2003; Bedard et al. 2006; Bedard et al. 2008) believe that provision of appropriate training to the 
professionals will help overcome the said limitations of electronic systems.  
With reference to the treatment, control and monitoring towards management of conflict of 
interests, literature suggests that the electronic decision aids play an important role as a safeguard 
and inform decisions about avoiding the situations involving conflict of interests, accepting the 
identified conflict of interests, sharing these with other parties, or reducing the conflict of interests 
to an acceptable level. Furthermore, electronic aids also seem to support the implementation of 
controls and continual supervision to determine if the controls are being executed properly. 
2.4.3. Consultation Units 
One of the ways for accounting firms to control risks is by developing specialised internal groups 
to assist practice offices in making decisions related to the financial statements of clients. These 
groups are termed Accounting Consultation Units (ACU) or Central Research Units (CRU) that 
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provide potential benefits to the professional accounting firms. The main benefits include financial 
support, consultation, documentation and research aimed at suggesting better solutions for the 
client’s accounting problems. These units are very well-formed especially in larger firms and 
provide an array of services. Importantly, firms view the consultation and research units as playing 
an important role (Bedard et al. 2008). Given the complexity and nature of negotiations between 
accounting firms and the clients, several researchers (Iyer and Rama 2004; Kadous et al. 2003; 
Trotman et al. 2005) tend to favour investment in such ACUs.  
Thus, the accounting consultation and research units are likely to be of significant use to the 
accounting professionals. Their utilisation, however, differs with the size of the firm with more 
well-organised functioning in larger accounting firms. Therefore, the literature indicates that 
consultation units have an important role to play as one of the safeguards in connection with 
effective management of conflict of interests, particularly at the stages of treatment, control and 
monitoring. For instance, the research unit can help find better solutions to address the conflict of 
interests that are likely to originate throughout the course of professional conduct.      
2.4.4. Whistleblowing 
Since whistleblowing is about making disclosure in public interest, there is an indispensable 
connection between whistleblowing and accounting profession since the primary interest of the 
later is also to serve in the best interest of the public. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
requires the audit committees of public companies to form whistleblowing mechanisms in order 
to enable the employees to raise their concerns about questionable accounting matters, with 
anonymity and confidentiality. According to the information collected through surveys, PwC 
(2005) provided that whistleblowing mechanisms increased the likelihood of employees’ reporting 
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about wrongdoings. Since its passage in 2002, SOX has extended its rulings on whistle-blowers’ 
protection. The strengthening of said protection is of relevance to the accounting professionals 
since they have an important role as an implied whistle-blower, should they find any instances of 
their clients’ fraudulent conduct (Bedard et al. 2008).      
Literature suggests that propensity of an accounting professional to blow a whistle on wrongdoings 
is strongly affected by the context in which wrong conduct takes place (Ayers and Kaplan 2003; 
Near et al. 2004; Latan et al. 2019). The likelihood of whistleblowing is also affected by individual 
characteristics such as the perceptions of whistleblowing, moral reasoning, individual’s sense of 
responsibility, locus of control, whistleblowing intentions, perceived moral intensity and position 
in the firm (Chiu 2003; Curtis 2006; Latan et al. 2019; Tavakoli et al. 2003). Furthermore, the 
organisational characteristics and organisational culture also affect whistleblowing behaviour 
(Kaplan and Whitecotton 2001).  
Thus, research suggests that whistleblowing mechanisms can be an effective way to control the 
audit-related risks. Their effectiveness, however, is largely affected by the individual, contextual 
and organisational factors. Importantly, employees are more likely to blow the whistle when 
confidentiality is ensured, a mechanism to whistle-blow are properly understood, and training is 
provided in this regard. Therefore, whistleblowing is an important safeguard in relation to 
managing conflict of interests in professional accounting firms, particularly at the stages of control 
and monitoring. 
2.4.5. Reviews and Inspections 
The main quality control inspections and ex-post engagement reviews examined in extant literature 
include engagement quality control reviews, peer reviews, regulatory quality control inspections 
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and reviews. Over the past two decades, the regulators have made these reviews mandatory, and 
from being conducted by peers to the regulators. These shifts evidence that the regulators consider 
such reviews as potential facilitators of audit quality. The literature demonstrates that engagement 
quality control reviews help in reducing audit risk in different ways. For instance, these reviews 
help improve the assessments of audit risk (Ayers and Kaplan 2003), tend to reduce the instances 
of a tendency to focus more on confirmatory than on disconfirming evidence and encourage 
engagement personnel to conduct thorough audit tests (Tucker and Matsumura 2002).  However, 
engagement quality control is to be completed before the audit report is issued.  
With reference to the association between peer reviews and audit quality, Deis and Giroux (1992) 
provided that accounting firms undertaking peer review process tend to conduct higher quality 
audits and that this trend of improvement continues over time with the continued participation of 
accounting firms in peer reviews. Furthermore, regulatory quality control reviews and inspections 
are conducted by the government in the form of ‘Desk Reviews’ and ‘Quality Control Reviews’, 
with a focus on examining if the firm complies with professional standards. However, the extent 
to which peer reviews detect problems in reviewed engagements is yet to be researched more 
(Bedard et al. 2008). 
Thus, the literature strongly asserts that the reviews and inspections play an important role as a 
safeguard in relation to the treatment, control and monitoring towards managing conflict of 
interests in professional accounting firms.  
2.4.6. Disclosures  
Given that the simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services gives rise to an obvious 
conflict of interests in professional accounting firms, provision of some of the non-audit services 
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is already barred by the regulators. For the rest, the disclosure of the provided non-audit services 
and the fee received is adopted as one of the ways to treat the problems associated with the actual 
and potential conflict of interests (Shafer et al. 2001). The proponents of disclosure policy (see 
Healy and Palepu 2001) believe that it tends to reduce the information gap between the informer 
and that informed. They asserted that disclosure facilitates market efficiency by mitigating the 
information gaps. Furthermore, due to the disclosure of non-audit services and the associated fee, 
advisees know about the advisor’s conflict of interests and thus aware of the fact that they have to 
discount the advice in order to undertake decisions.  
However, Cain et al. (2005) argue that while disclosure promises something for everyone, 
disclosures do not guarantee that professionals have acted in the best interest of the public, and 
further that they might be prone to providing more biased advice when they know that the advisee 
is aware of the conflict of interests. Arguably, the disclosure of non-audit services might make the 
public more sceptic of audit opinion and it might be perceived that there was lack of independence 
– in such instances, there might be independence in fact but not the independence in appearance 
(Moore et al. 2006). Overall, extant literature remains inconclusive about the effectiveness of 
disclosure of non-audit services and the associated fee as a safeguard towards managing conflict 
of interests. However, it seems obvious that while disclosures might be able to address the issue 
of independence in appearance, it cannot address independence in fact. 
3. Literature Analysis 
Now that literature in relation to the management of conflict of interests in professional accounting 
firms has been reviewed and interpreted in preceding sections, its critical analysis will be 
elaborated in this section. The analysis will be conducted across three closely related parallel 
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themes that have been identified from the reviewed literature. These themes are weaknesses in 
professional accounting regulations for addressing conflict of interests, misaligned incentives and 
disincentives in a professional accounting environment and the impact of cognitive processes on 
an accounting professional’s behaviour. 
3.1. Weaknesses in Professional Accounting Regulations  
The literature informing the establishment of context, treatment, and the control and monitoring 
towards managing conflict of interests makes it crystal clear that professional accounting firms are 
heavily regulated. The said literature draws attention towards an important question, i.e. if the 
accounting profession is so profoundly regulated, why is the problem of accounting professionals’ 
deviant decision-making behaviour due to the conflict of interests largely pervasive? The 
discussions in proceeding paragraphs of this sub-section will address this question.   
Moore et al. (2006) explained that conflict of interests results in involuntary bias rather than 
deliberate corruption. They argued that; since an accounting professional’s moral seduction is 
primarily facilitated by unconscious psychological processes, increasing the regulations to 
strengthen their independence does not guarantee the elimination of conflicting interests. 
Regulations to address audit quality seem insufficient for addressing the issues related to 
independence because such rules are not the only ways to avoid conflict of interests. Similarly, 
Cain et al. (2005), Guiral et al. (2010), Moore et al. (2006) found that the conflict of interests leads 
to unintentional bias rather than intentional dishonesty and that more than regulatory efforts are 
required to monitor such conflicting interests with a focus on addressing the unintentional biases.  
Clements, Neill and Stovall (2012) argued that regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley have only 
remained moderately successful in countering the effects of conflicts. Based on their critical 
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examination of conflicts of interest in the accounting profession, they strongly asserted that in the 
absence of revolutionary changes, conflicts of interest are likely to remain in the accounting 
profession for an indefinite future. They emphasised that accountants need to learn to identify and 
manage conflicts of interest and that educational efforts and professional training should be 
increased in this regard.  Furthermore, codes of conduct should be improved for their provisions 
regarding prioritisation of interests. As such, this research also highlights the weaknesses in 
existing regulatory efforts. Therefore, the literature suggests that due to the ineffectiveness of 
regulations in dealing with unconscious biases, the problem of accounting professionals’ deviant 
decision-making behaviour due to the conflict of interests is still pervasive.   
3.2. Misaligned Incentives and Disincentives  
The literature informing identification, analysis, and evaluation of conflict of interests reveals a 
wide range of circumstances that give rise to a conflict of interests in professional accounting 
firms. Particularly, the incentives and disincentives that are misaligned with compliant behaviour 
serve as one of the sources of conflict of interests. The said literature draws attention towards an 
important question, i.e. if the misaligned incentives and disincentive have been identified as one of 
the potential sources of conflict of interests for accounting professionals, why is the problem of 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour due to the conflict of interests 
largely pervasive? The discussions in proceeding paragraphs of this sub-section will address this 
question.   
A detailed review of literature (Beattie et al. 2005; Moore and Loewenstein 2004; Moore et al. 
2005; Moore et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2010) and some inspections reports by Audit Quality 
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Inspection Annual Reports 2011 - 2015 (Financial Reporting Council 2016) reveals the following 
three main sources of secondary interests for the accounting professionals.  
i. Misaligned Incentives with Roots in Temptation for Gain  
Various incentives with roots in temptation for gain are likely to induce accounting professionals 
to prioritise clients’ interest over the public. For instance, the incentives to please clients and to 
retain them include higher fees for audit and non-audit services, job opportunities with clients, and 
close relationship with clients etc. With such structural arrangements, professionals are likely to 
face financial as well as non-financial gains including; higher fees, the possibility of a regular 
stream of income, and temptation for attractive job opportunities with clients. Similarly, 
misaligned incentives also originate from within the reward structures of accounting firms such 
as; performance evaluations based on pleasing and retaining the clients, bonuses paid for bringing 
in new clients for non-audit services and promotions of junior staff based on how well they cope 
with the priorities of their seniors.  
In the situations as above, the secondary interests for a professional might take various forms such 
as; ‘because I want to earn the bonus offered for pleasing the clients and thus retaining them, I 
should prioritise client’s interest’ or ‘because I want the job with client, I must prioritise client’s 
interest’. Therefore, misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain give rise to conflicting 
secondary and primary interests.  
ii. Misaligned Incentives with Roots in Fear of Loss 
Various incentives with roots in fear of loss (e.g. fear of losing the clients and thus the regular 
stream of income, loss of bonus and of the promotion opportunities etc.) are likely to induce 
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accounting professionals to prioritise clients’ interest over the public. Although, the misaligned 
incentives with roots in temptation for gain and those with roots in fear of loss are closely related 
and might seem exactly the same at first instance, however, with individual as a unit of analysis, 
research (see, for example, Gonzalez et al. 2005, Jepma and López-Solà 2014) suggests that people 
respond differently to what they deem rewarding and to what they consider fearsome, and that they 
react differently to a particular choice depending on whether it is presented as a gain or as loss – 
framing effect.  
In case of misaligned incentives with roots in fear of loss, the secondary interests for an accounting 
professional might take various forms such as; ‘because I don’t want to lose the bonus offered for 
pleasing the clients and thus retaining them, I should prioritise client’s interest’ or ‘because I 
don’t want to lose the chances of promotion based on pleasing and retaining the clients, I have to 
prioritise client’s interest’. Therefore, misaligned incentives with roots in fear of loss give rise to 
conflicting secondary and primary interests.  
iii. Workplace Pressures with Roots in Fear of Loss 
As reviewed in the preceding section, auditing literature has associated various workplace 
pressures (such as commercial pressures, time pressure, time budgets, unrealistic goals, peer 
pressure, and obedience pressure etc.) to a wide range of dysfunctional practices. For instance, 
acute time pressure leads to a reduction in audit quality due to the accountants’ tendency to cutting 
the sample sizes or reducing audit hours etc. They do so because they face various fears such as; 
threat to career progression in the firm, loss of bonus for failing to achieve the target in the 
stipulated time, and loss of reputation as an efficient employee etc.  
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In the situations as above, the secondary interests for a professional might take various forms such 
as; ‘because I don’t want to lose the chances of career progression, I have to comply with the 
instruction of my senior that client’s interest should be prioritised (obedience pressure)’. 
Resultantly, audit quality suffers which is tantamount to compromising the primary interest of the 
profession. Similarly, an in-depth insight into the International Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (IESBA 2018) and the literature relevant to conflict of interests (see Juhari et al. 2013) 
suggest that the root causes underlying self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity, and 
intimidation threats are primarily the misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain, that 
with roots in fear of loss, and workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss.  
Therefore, literature suggests that due to the apparent lack of focus on root causes of conflict of 
interests (i.e. misaligned incentives with roots in temptation for gain, that with roots in fear of loss 
and the workplace pressures with roots in fear of loss) at the level of an individual professional, 
the problem of accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour due to the conflict of 
interests is still largely pervasive.  
3.3. Unconscious and Conscious Aspects of Ethical Decision-Making 
The behavioural literature informing identification, analysis, and evaluation of conflict of interests 
tends to focus on the psychological and cognitive impacts of conflict of interests on an accounting 
professional’s behaviour. Particularly, the simultaneous role of conscious and unconscious 
perceptual biases is asserted. The said literature draws attention towards an important question i.e. 
why despite accounting professionals’ good intentions, is the problem of their deviant decision-
making behaviour due to the conflict of interests largely pervasive? The discussions in proceeding 
paragraphs of this sub-section will address this question. 
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Research regarding the psychology of conflict of interests (see, for example, Bazerman et al. 2002; 
Moore et al. 2006) suggests that various perceptual biases including; selective perception bias, 
escalation of commitment bias, plausible deniability, and discounting of information bias act as 
the barriers to compliant decision-making in the face of conflicting interests. Similarly, literature 
related to cognitive psychology of conflict of interest (see Guiral et al. 2010) provides that conflict 
of interest act through the agency of involuntary biases to affect judgement and decision-making. 
These studies, therefore, draw attention towards the examination of conflict of interests at the level 
of an individual professional accountant. Interestingly, most of the studies in relation to managing 
conflict of interests have focused on accounting firms as the unit of analysis.  
Even more interestingly, an in-depth analysis of literature regarding  structural origin of conflict 
of interests (see, for example, Moore et al. 2003; Moore et al. 2006; Moore et al. 2010)  indicate 
that the structural arrangements between accounting firms and the clients (such as, long-term 
relationship, simultaneous provision of audit and non-audit services, hiring and firing by clients, 
and employment opportunities with clients etc.) exert their impact on professionals’ judgement 
through cognitive processes in their minds and brains. All such studies imply that accounting 
professionals are the one experiencing a conflict of interests and, therefore, it is essential to give 
due consideration to psychological and cognitive perspectives to manage conflict of interests. 
The behavioural literature towards assessment, treatment, and control and monitoring towards the 
management of conflict of interests also make their connection to the role of regulatory and 
legislative efforts for addressing conflict of interests. For instance, studies regarding the impact of 
psychological barriers on ethical decisions involving conflict of interests (see Chugh et al. 2005) 
and those examining decision-making in the face of ethical dilemmas (see, for example, Casebeer 
and Churchland 2003; Greene et al. 2001; Green et al. 2010) indicate that the existing safeguards, 
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legislation and regulation have limited effectiveness towards handling the devastating 
ramifications of conflict of interests. Notably, this differentiation between the controlled cognitive 
and the automatic affective processes has long prevailed in the psychology (see, for example, 
Zajonc 1980, 1984; Zajonc and McIntosh 1992) and the neuroscience literature (see, for example, 
Damasio 2006; LeDoux 1999; Panksepp 1998, 2009; Wagar and Thagard 2004). There is growing 
evidence that behaviour is affected by both the controlled cognitive processes (Wolford et al. 2000) 
and the automatic affective processes (Bargh et al. 1996; Bargh and Chartr 1999; Schneider and 
Shiffrin 1977).  
Similarly, Moll et al. (2005) found that ethical decision-making draws on the integration of the 
processes in the unconscious as well as the conscious regions of the brain. In this regard, Chugh 
et al. (2005) explained the phenomenon of bounded ethicality which implies that the ethical 
decisions involving a conflict of interests are likely to introduce bounds on conscious thinking and 
the biases in unconscious thinking. There, however, is a need for more research in this regard. 
Therefore, due to the lack of focus on the unconscious and conscious cognitive barriers that 
individual accounting professionals experience in the face of conflicting interests, the problem of 
accounting professionals’ deviant decision-making behaviour is still pervasive. In this regard, 
Bazerman and Gino (2012) strongly assert that adoption of behavioural ethics is better than the 
traditional approaches. 
4. Gaps in the Literature 
Discussions of literature across establishing the context, assessment, treatment, and control and 
monitoring towards managing conflict of interests revealed that there is a rich literature base to 
inform these various stages. Although it appears that research has been done in this regard, it still 
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is not enough to address the issues surrounding conflict of interests in the professional accounting 
environment. 
The critical analysis in previous section clarifies that the problem of accounting professionals’ 
deviant decision-making behaviour due to the conflict of interests is largely pervasive due to 
ineffectiveness of regulations in dealing with unconscious biases (Cain et al. 2005; Guiral et al. 
2010; Moore et al. 2006), the apparent lack of focus on root causes of conflict of interests at the 
level of an individual professional (Ayal and Gino 2012; Bazerman and Gino 2012; Moore et al. 
2010), and the lack of focus on unconscious and conscious cognitive barriers that individual 
accounting professionals experience in the face of conflicting interests (Bazerman and Gino 2012; 
Moore et al. 2010; Nelson 2004). These studies suggest that the primary reason underlying 
pervasiveness of professionals’ deviant behaviour is the ineffective management of conflict of 
interests in professional accounting firms. Since decision-making in situations involving the 
conflict of interests is an outcome of both the conscious and the unconscious mental processes, 
there is a need for further empirical examination.  
Interestingly, the research on the unconscious and conscious cognitions advanced research on the 
implications of moral intuition for ethical decision-making and organisational research (see, for 
example, Culham 2013, 2015; Weaver et al. 2014; Woiceshyn 2011). Even recently, there have 
been calls for rethinking the reasoning standard and to account for intuition in the decision-making 
process (Hermann et al. 2017). Still, others have noted the interplay between moral intuition and 
moral reasoning during ethical decision-making (see Zollo et al. 2017). These studies imply that 
moral intuition has implications for decision-making in the face of a conflict of interests – 
surprisingly, professional accounting research has not sufficiently explored this topic. While some 
research has made a slight reference to ethical/moral intuition (Bangan and Asri 2017; Bobek et 
Maria Ishaque, 2019 Accepted Version Journal of Business Ethics 
 38 
al. 2015; Kung and Huang 2013), there remains a significant lack of research in this regard. Thus, 
‘understanding the implications of moral intuition’ should be one of the essentials to facilitate 
effective management of conflict of interests.  
Therefore, the causes of the pervasiveness of deviant decision-making behaviour in professional 
accounting firms highlight some interconnected gaps regarding the management of conflict of 
interests. For instance, there is an insufficiency of research with an individual accounting 
professional as the unit of analysis. Secondly, there still is a lack of understanding about why, 
despite their good intentions, accounting professionals sometimes serve secondary interests at the 
cost of primary interest. Thirdly, there is a need to further explore the unconscious and conscious 
cognitive consequences of the conflict of interests. Fourthly, most of the research has focused on 
independence in appearance and not on that in fact. Fifth, there is a significant lack of research 
examining the implications of moral intuition for decision-making in the face of a conflict of 
interests. These five gaps converge into one main gap, i.e. a lack of understanding about how a 
conflict of interests operates at the level of an individual accounting professional.  
The need to address the identified gap is supported by some researchers (Ayal and Gino 2012; 
Cain et al. 2005; Guiral et al. 2010; Moore et al. 2010). With reference to the gap in the literature, 
Tenbrunsel (2005) suggests that understanding the operation of conflict of interests is about 
recognising the cognitive obstacles (unconscious and conscious) to compliant decision-making, 
and then finding out how to overcome these barriers. Similarly, Moore et al. (2010) call for 
examining the interaction of conflict of interests with professionals’ decision-making as a way to 
understand how such conflicts operate at the level of an individual professional.  
Accordingly, in order to fill the identified gap, future research on managing conflict of interests in 
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professional accounting firms can potentially explore the relationship between conflict of interests 
and the professionals’ decision-making behaviour, the role of professionals’ unconscious and 
conscious cognitive processes towards their decision-making behaviour, and perceptual biases due 
to conflict of interests. It is expected that research in these areas will help to;  
• testify the threatening impact of different categories of conflict of interests on the 
accounting professionals’ adoption of compliant behaviour,  
• understand the role of accounting professionals’ unconscious and conscious cognitive 
processes towards their decision-making behaviour in the events of conflict of interests,  
• foster research on the implications of moral intuition for the professionals’ judgement and 
decision-making behaviour, and 
• understand the process through which the unintentional and/or intentional perceptual bias 
might increase the likelihood of deviant decision-making behaviour. 
Since the proposed research areas are relevant to accounting professionals’ state of mind, the 
insights obtained by addressing these concerns might be combined to strengthen their 
independence in fact and, resultantly, to facilitate the process of managing conflict of interests. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper summarised the extant research related to managing conflict of interests in professional 
accounting firms. The conflict of interests in professional accounting firms has been viewed 
through the lens of behavioural risk management which provides a new horizon for addressing the 
longstanding problem of accounting professionals’ deviant behaviour due to conflict of interests. 
The synthesis of relevant research highlighted that the primary focus of existing measures and 
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regulations on making the accounting professionals appear independent to the public (i.e. 
independence in appearance) is one of the reasons for the prevalence of the professionals’ deviant 
behaviour. The existing measures and regulations need to be strengthened for dealing with the 
accounting professionals’ actual objectivity and state of mind, i.e. their independence in fact. The 
key message is that, for effective management of conflict of interests, the behavioural interventions 
to strengthen the professionals’ independence in fact should be informed by their unconscious 
(automatic) as well as the conscious (controlled) cognitive processes.   
This research synthesis has the potential to guide future researchers for addressing conflict of 
interests as a topic deserving of its own focus. The identified gap(s) in the literature and the 
subsequent proposed research areas can guide future research seeking to understand the operation 
of conflict of interests at the level of an individual accounting professional. On a practical level, 
the professional accounting firms and other relevant professions, accounting professionals and the 
regulators can use this synthesised literature for making better decisions and improving their 
policies towards managing the risk of conflict of interests. This paper holds further significance 
because it views the conflict of interests, exclusively, through the lens of behavioural risk 
management. The framework adopted to review, interpret and analyse the existing literature is 
unique to this study. However, the classification of extant literature across the establishment of 
context, assessment, treatment, control and monitoring of conflict of interests should be considered 
as based on the researcher’s discretion and having an element of subjectivity. 
Notes 
1. AICPA – American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; NASBA – National Association 
of State Boards of Accountancy; AAT – Association of Accounting Technicians; ACCA – 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; ICAEW – Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
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England and Wales; CIMA – Certified Institute of Management Accountants ; CIPFA – Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy ; ICAS – Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS) ; CAI – Chartered Accountants Ireland.    
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